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Adverse selection in a community-based health
insurance scheme in rural Africa: Implications for
introducing targeted subsidies
Divya Parmar1,3*, Aurélia Souares1, Manuela de Allegri1, Germain Savadogo1,2 and Rainer Sauerborn1
Abstract
Background: Although most community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes are voluntary, problem of adverse
selection is hardly studied. Evidence on the impact of targeted subsidies on adverse selection is completely missing.
This paper investigates adverse selection in a CBHI scheme in Burkina Faso. First, we studied the change in adverse
selection over a period of 4 years. Second, we studied the effect of targeted subsidies on adverse selection.
Methods: The study area, covering 41 villages and 1 town, was divided into 33 clusters and CBHI was randomly
offered to these clusters during 2004–06. In 2007, premium subsidies were offered to the poor households. The
data was collected by a household panel survey 2004–2007 from randomly selected households in these 33
clusters (n = 6795). We applied fixed effect models.
Results: We found weak evidence of adverse selection before the implementation of subsidies. Adverse selection
significantly increased the next year and targeted subsidies largely explained this increase.
Conclusions: Adverse selection is an important concern for any voluntary health insurance scheme. Targeted
subsidies are often used as a tool to pursue the vision of universal coverage. At the same time targeted subsidies
are also associated with increased adverse selection as found in this study. Therefore, it’s essential that targeted
subsidies for poor (or other high-risk groups) must be accompanied with a sound plan to bridge the financial gap
due to adverse selection so that these schemes can continue to serve these populations.
Keywords: Community-based health insurance, Adverse selection, Subsidy, Burkina Faso, Fixed effects
Background
Over the last two decades community-based health in-
surance (CBHI), also referred to as micro health insur-
ance or voluntary health insurance, has rapidly grown as
a health financing tool in low and middle income coun-
tries, in areas where government or employer-based
health insurance is absent. CBHI works by pooling risks
and resources at the community level. The aim of such
schemes is to facilitate access to healthcare and increase
financial protection against the cost of illness [1-5]
Membership in most CBHI schemes is voluntary. Atim
[6], Criel [7], Carrin [8], Preket et al. [9] have pointed
out that voluntary membership can make these schemes
vulnerable to adverse selection. Adverse selection results
when high-risk or sick individuals are more likely to buy
health insurance than the low-risk or healthy individuals.
In the presence of adverse selection, the premiums
which are fixed at the average risk in the population are
not enough to cover all the claims. Hence, the financial
sustainability of the scheme is jeopardized [10,11]. To
limit adverse selection some schemes have restricted en-
rollment to the group level. Group can be defined as a
household, firm, school etc. Group enrolment ensures
that all individuals in the group enroll which includes
both high- and low-risk individuals, reducing the risk of
adverse selection.
Adverse selection has been studied extensively in the
context of high-income countries [12-16]. Most of the re-
search is focused on employer or government insurance
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schemes. There are few studies from low and middle in-
come countries that have analyzed adverse selection in
CBHI schemes in detail. The evidence so far is mixed.
Wang et al. [17] found the presence of adverse selection
in the Rural Mutual Health Care in China. Noterman
et al. [18] studied a prepayment scheme for hospital care
in Zaire and found adverse selection among women in
their reproductive age. On the other hand, Dror et al. [19]
examined the Micro Health Insurance Units in Philippines
and concluded that there was no adverse selection as the
morbidities among the insured and uninsured was same as
concluded by De Allegri et al. [20] for the CBHI scheme in
Burkina Faso. Resende and Zeidan [21] also did not find ad-
verse selection in the Brazilian individual health insurance
market.
Most of these studies are based on cross-sectional data
and therefore have not studied whether the process of
adverse selection changed over time. One exception is
the study by Zang and Wang [22] that analyzed the New
Corporative Medical scheme in China and found that
adverse selection persisted in the subsequent enrolments
but did not become worse over time and even displayed
a trend of decline, although this trend was not signifi-
cant. Another exception is the study by Wang et al. [17]
of the Rural Mutual Health Care in China. They found
that even though enrollment in the scheme was
restricted to households this was not strictly enforced
and 1/3rd of the households were partially enrolled. Ad-
verse selection mainly occurred in these partially en-
rolled households.
Premium subsidy is a mechanism that can mitigate
adverse selection. This is because premium subsidy by
reducing the cost of buying health insurance attracts
individuals with low risks [23]. However, in the case
of targeted subsidy, the impact on adverse selection is
not clear. After subsidy if high-risk individuals from
the targeted group enroll more than others, adverse
selection will increase. However, if high-risk indivi-
duals are already enrolled from this group and the
subsidy encourages the low-risk individuals to enroll,
adverse selection will reduce. Even though targeted
premium subsidies are increasing talked about in the
context of CBHI schemes, we did not find any study
that has captured the effect of these subsidies on ad-
verse selection.
Hence, despite the popularity of CBHI schemes in low
and middle income countries, evidence on adverse selec-
tion is limited and very few have studied the change in
adverse section over time. Moreover, evidence on the ef-
fect of premium subsidies on adverse selection is com-
pletely missing. This study sets to fill these gaps in
knowledge. We first examined the change in adverse se-
lection over time and second, we evaluated the effect of
targeted subsidies on adverse selection.
Methods
Research setting and the CBHI scheme
Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries in the world
with 43% of its population living below the poverty line.
According to The World Bank [24], Burkina Faso has the
lowest adult and youth literacy rates in sub-Saharan Africa.
About 90% of its labor force is engaged in subsistence agri-
culture that contributes about 30% to the national GDP.
Modern infrastructure is rare and concentrated mainly in
the capital Ouagadougou. Less than 5% of its 92,000 km of
roads are paved [25]. Our study took place in the Nouna
Health District (NHD) located in northwest Burkina Faso,
about 300 km from Ouagadougou. It is a dry orchard
savannah region with 230,000 inhabitants of whom 10% live
in Nouna town, the district capital.
A CBHI scheme, “Assurance Maladie à Base Commu-
nautaire”, was introduced in a portion of NHD where a
Demographic Surveillance System (DSS) has been operat-
ing since 1993. CBHI was introduced in three phases be-
tween 2004 and 2006, following a clustered-randomized
control trial (CRCT) implementation design. The study
area, spread over 41 villages and Nouna town, was divided
into 33 clusters: 24 rural (villages) and 9 urban (town of
Nouna). Small neighboring villages that shared common
ethnic and kin ties were grouped together to form a single
cluster. Each year, 11 randomly selected clusters were pro-
gressively offered the opportunity to enroll into CBHI.
Since 2006, all 33 clusters have been offered the opportun-
ity to enroll in CBHI every year. The trial is described in
more details elsewhere [26].
Enrolment in CBHI is voluntary. To limit adverse selec-
tion the unit of enrolment is set as a household. In addition,
three months waiting period is enforced during which the
enrollees are not entitled to receive CBHI benefits. Al-
though the unit of enrolment is the household, the annual
premium is set on an individual basis: 1500 CFA (2.29€) for
an adult and 500 CFA (0.76€) for a child (less than 15 years
old). The premium was set based on feasibility and
willingness-to-pay (WTP) studies previously conducted in
this region [27,28]. The premium for the entire household
is paid in one single installment, at the beginning of the
year, after the harvest. Membership is renewed yearly. The
benefit package includes a wide range of first- and second-
line medical services available within the NHD. The en-
rolled are asked to seek care at a pre-assigned first-line fa-
cility and only if referred they can access services at the
District Hospital in Nouna. There are no copayments,
deductibles or ceiling on the benefits.
Even though the enrolment increased gradually, it has
remained low over time, especially among the poor
households. De Allegri et al. [29] and Dong et al. [30]
highlighted that the poor households found it difficult to
pay for the scheme. Dong et al. [30] also found financial
barriers as one of the main reasons why households did
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not renew their membership. Based on these findings, in
2007, it was decided to offer a 50% premium subsidy to the
poor households. The poor households were identified by
means of a community wealth-ranking (CWR) exercise
described in detail by Souares et al. [31]. In brief, CWR
entailed four steps in every village. First, a Focus Group
Discussion (FGD) was conducted with the villagers to iden-
tify elements defining wealth and poverty to create wealth
categories accordingly. The participants together with the
village administrators and traditional leaders also identified
three key informants (KI) who knew the households well.
Second, each KI individually ranked all the households
according to the wealth categories defined by the FGD.
Third, the KIs shared their ranking with each other. In case
of conflicting ranking for one household, the KIs discussed
their decision until they came to a consensus. Households
ranked as the bottom 20% were regarded as poor. Since
2007, CWR has been conducted every two years. The poor
households identified continue to be offered subsidized pre-
miums: 750 CFA (1.14€) for an adult and 250 CFA (0.38€)
for a child.
Data
This study used data from four rounds (2004–2007) of
the Nouna Health District Household Survey (NHDHS).
The survey is described in detail by De Allegri et al. [26].
In brief, 990 households i.e. 30 households per cluster
were randomly included in the NHDHS, approximately
7900 individuals or 10% of the population. The DSS pro-
vided the sampling frame. The analysis presented here
included only those individuals who were offered CBHI
in a particular year.
Every year, the NHDHS field team interviews the house-
hold members of these 990 households and collects data on
demographic and socio-economic indicators, self-reported
morbidity, health care seeking behavior, insurance member-
ship, and perceptions about the quality of health services.
Analytical model
To study adverse selection, we wanted to estimate the influ-
ence of health status on insurance status, after controlling
for all other variables. A fixed effects (FE) linear probability
model, that took advantage of the panel nature of the sam-
ple i.e. repeated observations, was used. A linear probability
model was preferred as it can be used to estimate fixed
effects without losing a lot of sample, as would be the case
with a fixed effects logit model.
Our panel model can be described as:
Insuranceitþ1 ¼ f Zi:β1i þ Xit :β2i þ HSit :β3 þ Yt :β4
 
ð1Þ
where i = 1,. . .,n represents individuals and t = 4,5,6,7
represents years. Insuranceit+1 is a binary choice variable
that denotes the insurance status of the individual; HSit
denotes the health status of the individual at the time of
purchasing health insurance. Zi is a vector of time-
invariant individual characteristics (like religion and sex)
and Xit is a vector of time-varying observed characteris-
tics (like age and household size); Yt is a set of year
dummies that capture time shocks.
Observed Zi was not explicitly included because in a
FE model, individual-specific dummy variables were cre-
ated that captured all time-constant variation. The effect
of health status on insurance status was captured by β3,
after controlling for Xit time-varying variables and all
observed and unobserved time-constant variables.
To study the change in adverse selection over time, we
included an interaction term for health insurance and
year. To study the effect of subsidy on adverse selection,
we re-ran the FE regression with an interaction term for
subsidy and health status. Hence, the FE regression was
done twice with different interaction terms.
Even though the unit of enrolment was restricted to a
household to limit adverse selection, this rule was not
strictly followed. There were instances when some mem-
bers in the household enrolled while others did not.
Therefore, in line with earlier studies [17,22] we used
individuals as our unit of analysis.
Variables
The definitions of the variables and their summary sta-
tistics are shown in Table 1.
Dependent variable: insurance status
We created a binary choice dependent variable that
depicted the insurance status of the individual for every
year (1 = individual enrolled in the scheme; 0 = individual
not enrolled in the scheme).
Independent variables
Health status
We created a variable, sick, to predict an individual’s
health status. Every household member, 10 years or
older, was asked if (s)he was suffering from any illness
that was continuing for more than three months at the
time of the survey. For individuals younger than 10 years,
their caretaker (preferably their mother) was asked.
Subsidy
To measure the effect of the subsidized premiums a bin-
ary variable, subsidy, was created. (1 = individuals offered
premium subsidy; 0 = individual not offered premium
subsidy).
Year
To capture time shocks, year dummies were included.
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Interaction terms
To measure the change in adverse selection over time,
the interaction term, sick X year was created. To meas-
ure the effect of subsidy on adverse selection, the inter-
action term, sick X subsidy was created.
Other variables
In addition to health status, other individual and house-
hold level variables were also included – household
socio-economic status (SES), household size, education
and age of the individual. Household SES was estimated
by using principal components analysis (PCA) [32].
Household ownership of durable goods (plough, bicycle,
radio, television and telephone) and livestock (poultry,
sheep, goat, cattle, donkey, pig and horse) were used in
the PCA. Households were divided into three groups
(low SES, mid SES and high SES). It was assumed that
households with higher SES would have higher enrol-
ment because they could better afford to pay for CBHI,
compared to lower SES households. A continuous vari-
able, size, was included to measure household size since
previous research of De Allegri et al. [29] and Dong
et al. [30] had identified a link between household size
and both enrolment and renewal rates.
Ethical approval
The study protocol was approved by the Ethical
Committee of the Medical Faculty of the University of
Heidelberg, Germany (130/2002), and by the Nouna Eth-
ical Committee in Nouna, Burkina Faso.
Results
Data is described in Table 2. The sample of individuals
increased during 2004–06, as more clusters were offered
CBHI as part of the CRCT. Enrolment remained low,
between 4–6.3%, but increased gradually. There was a
steep increase in enrolment in 2007 when 218 (62.5%)
new individuals enrolled. Dropouts (defined as indivi-
duals not renewing their membership in the following
year) were high. Dropouts were highest in 2006 when 77
out of 201 i.e. 38% of those who enrolled in 2005 did
not renew their membership.
Table 1 Definition and descriptive statistics of independent variables
Variables Definition Percentage (%) or Mean
2004 2005 2006 2007 Average
n a No. of individuals 2878 4360 5725 5517 -
Health Status
Sick 1 if sick b; 0 otherwise* 17.9 19.2 19.4 19.3 19.1
Age (years)
≤ 15 Age 15 years or less 45.4 42.5 40.5 38.4 41.2
16-59 Age between 16–59 years* 47.6 50.8 52.2 53.7 51.6
60+ Age 60 years or older 6.9 6.7 7.4 7.9 7.3
Education
Literate 1 if can read/write; 0 otherwise* 31.7 37.2 40.8 43.8 39.4
Subsidized c
Subsidy 1 if given subsidy in insurance premium; 0 otherwise* - - - 18.3 5.3
Household size
Size Number of individuals in the household 11.9 11.0 12.1 12.4 11.9
SES
LowSES Household SES below 33.33th percentile* 34.0 32.1 33.4 33.3 33.1
MidSES Household SES between 33.33th and 66.67th percentile 33.5 32.9 33.2 33.4 33.2
HighSES Household SES above 66.67th percentile 32.5 35.0 33.3 33.3 33.6
Year
2004 Year 2004* - - - - 15.6
2005 Year 2005 - - - - 23.6
2006 Year 2006 - - - - 31.0
2007 Year 2007 - - - - 29.8
a Insurance was offered in a phased manner. From 2006 everyone was eligible for insurance.
b Individual was considered sick if (s)he had an illness for at least 3 months at the time of the survey.
c Subsidy was offered only in year 2007.
* Reference category for multivariate analysis.
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Table 2 gives the mean or percentage for categorical
variables for all independent variables. Every year 17.9%
to 19.4% of the individuals were sick. The number of
individuals in the younger age group decreased as the
sample become older. On an average 39.4% of the indivi-
duals were literate. The household size remained stable
at about 12 individuals per household. In this sample
18% of the individuals were offered premium subsidy in
2007.
Table 3 gives the mean or percentage for categorical
variables for all independent variables by insurance sta-
tus. Every year, a higher percentage of sick individuals
were found in the insured group compared to the unin-
sured group. However, this difference was not found to
be significant in 2004–06 suggesting that there was weak
evidence for the presence of adverse selection during
this time. However, in 2007 the insured group had sig-
nificantly higher percentage of sick individuals providing
strong evidence for adverse selection.
With regard to other variables, the age composition of
the insured and uninsured groups was similar although
the insured group had slightly more individuals above
60 years than the uninsured one. The insured groups
had more percentage of individuals who were offered
subsidy than the uninsured group (31.8% vs. 17.3%). In
2004 about 13% of individuals in the insured group were
from low SES households. The following two years there
were even less individuals from low SES households in
the insured group (7% and 3.4%). In 2007, this percent-
age significantly increased to 26%. Before 2007, house-
hold size of individuals in the insured group was
significantly larger than the uninsured group. Through-
out this period, the insured group had a higher percent-
age of literate than the uninsured group.
FE results
FE results are shown in Table 4. Column 1 shows the
results when interaction term sick X year was included
(model 1) and column 2 shows the results when inter-
action term sick X subsidy was included (model 2). Refer-
ring to the interaction terms in model 1, adverse selection
was the same during period 2004–2006. In 2007 adverse
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of independent variables by insurance status
Variables Percentage (%) or Mean
2004 2005 2006 2007
I = 0 I = 1 p-value I = 0 I = 1 p-value I = 0 I = 1 p-value I = 0 I = 1 p-value
n 2752 126 - 4159 201 - 5489 236 - 5168 349 -
Health status
Sick 17.8 20.6 0.412 19.1 22.4 0.242 19.3 22.0 0.301 18.8 26.7 0.000
Age (years)
≤ 15 45.4 45.2 0.968 42.6 41.3 0.718 40.5 40.3 0.949 38.6 36.4 0.415
16-59 47.6 47.6 0.997 50.9 50.2 0.868 50.2 50.4 0.586 53.7 53.3 0.884
60+ 6.9 7.1 0.930 6.6 8.5 0.294 7.3 9.3 0.246 7.7 10.3 0.082
Education
Literate 31.4 39.7 0.050 37.1 41.3 0.223 40.2 54.2 0.000 43.3 52.1 0.001
Subsidized
Subsidy - - - - - - - - - 17.3 31.8 0.000
Household size
Size 11.8 14.0 0.005 10.9 13.0 0.000 11.9 17.5 0.000 12.4 12.0 0.408
SES
LowSES 34.9 13.5 0.000 33.1 7.0 0.000 34.7 3.4 0.000 33.8 26.1 0.000
MidSES 33.7 30.2 32.6 40.3 33.5 27.5 33.9 25.2
HighSES 31.4 56.3 34.3 52.7 31.8 69.1 32.3 48.7
I = 0 denotes uninsured individuals and I = 1 denotes insured individuals.
Refer to Table 2 for variable definitions.






2004 - 126 - 126 (4.38%) 2878
2005 23 103 98 201 (4.61%) 4360
2006 77 123 113 236 (4.12%) 5725
2007 43 218 131 349 (6.33%) 5517
a These numbers correspond to the insured individuals covered by the
household survey. The population enrolment rates were 4.5%, 5.0%, 3.9% and
6.1% for years 2004 to 2007.
b Refers to the total number of individuals offered insurance who were
interviewed in the household survey.
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selection increased i.e. probability of sick individuals en-
rolling into CBHI increased (coefficient = 0.021). The
interaction term in model 2, sick X subsidy, is positive and
highly significant (coefficient = 0.048), implying that sick
individuals who were offered subsidy had a higher prob-
ability to enroll compared to sick individuals who were
not offered subsidy.
With regard to other variables, individuals from smal-
ler households and from households who were offered
subsidy were more likely to enroll. Individuals from low
SES households were less likely to enroll. Year 2007 was
associated with increased enrolment. Education and age
were not associated with CBHI status.
Discussion
Our study represents one of the very few attempts that
captured the change in adverse selection over time in
the context of CBHI. Additionally we provide possibly
the first empirical evidence on the impact of targeted
subsidies on adverse selection.
Our study found weak evidence of adverse selection
before 2007, but strong evidence of adverse selection the
following year. This is in line with an earlier study con-
ducted by De Allegri et al. [20] who found no evidence
of adverse selection in 2004. However, there are two
points of differences that should be mentioned. Unlike
the earlier study, our point estimates showed that the
insured group had a higher percentage of sick indivi-
duals as compared to uninsured group for all the years,
although this difference was not found to be statistically
significant for 2004–06. However the earlier study found
an equal percentage of sick individuals in both the
groups. Second, our study reported about 19% indivi-
duals as sick much less than the 65% reported by the
earlier study. These differences could be because the
earlier study was conducted at the household level where
the whole household was considered sick if any one
member in the household reported being sick while we
did the analysis at the individual level.
Mandatory enrolment can completely avoid the problem
of adverse selection. It has been implemented in Ghana
and Rwanda however the current situation in many other
low income countries makes it almost impossible to im-
plement in the near future. When mandatory enrolment is
not an option other measures can be taken. Group enrol-
ment is one such measure to reduce the risk of adverse
selection. As found by Wang et al. [17] for the Rural Mu-
tual Health Care in China adverse selection mainly oc-
curred in the partially enrolled households. If group
enrolment is properly enforced, adverse selection can be
reduced as it will ensure that all group members, sick and
healthy, enroll. However, group enrolment may not en-
tirely eliminate adverse select as high-risk groups may be
more attracted to voluntary CBHI (e.g. households with
many members with a chronic illness may enroll more).
Other measures that can further limit adverse selection
like reducing the time period for enrolment and enforcing
a waiting period during which CBHI benefits are not avail-
able can be implemented. These measures reduce the like-
lihood of buying insurance at a time when one of the
family members falls sick [7].
For the CBHI scheme in Nouna, even though enrol-
ment was restricted to a household, this rule was not
strictly enforced and we found that there were partially
enrolled households. Due to lack of appropriate data it
Table 4 FE results
Variables (1) (2)
Sick x Year Sick x Subsidy
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Age (years)
≤ 15 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.009
60+ 0.015 0.036 0.018 0.036
Education
Literate −0.001 0.006 −0.002 0.006
Subsidized
Subsidy 0.100 0.011*** 0.090 0.012***
Household size
Size −0.002 0.001*** −0.002 0.001***
SES
MidSES 0.015 0.006*** 0.015 0.006***
HighSES 0.028 0.007*** 0.028 0.007***
Year
2005 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
2006 −0.002 0.003 −0.001 0.003
2007 0.009 0.004** 0.013 0.004***
Sick X Yeara
Sick 0.001 0.010 - -
Sick x 2005 0.000 0.009 - -
Sick x 2006 0.008 0.009 - -
Sick x 2007 0.021 0.011** - -
Sick X Subsidyb
Sick - - 0.008 0.007
Sick x Subsidy - - 0.048 0.027*
No. of observations 18480 18480
No. of individuals 6713 6713
F statistic (p-value) 11.47 (0.000) 13.22 (0.000)
R2 0.0078 0.0079
Dependent variable: Insurance status dummy variable.
a Interaction term only included in Model 1.
b Interaction term only included in Model 2.
Refer to Table 2 for variable definitions.
***1%, **5% and *10% significance levels.
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was not possible to ascertain whether adverse selection
was primarily due to these households. With regard to
other measures a waiting period (3 months) was applied
however the enrolment period in some years extended
to 3 months. By reducing the enrolment period and en-
forcing household enrolment adverse selection could be
reduced.
Our study also demonstrated that the poor individuals
who were offered subsidy had a higher probability of
being sick. Since the subsidy was offered in 2007, this
explains the sudden spike in adverse selection seen that
year. As the poor lack access to clean water, sanitation
and adequate nutrition they are more likely to face
higher health risks [33]. This correction between poverty
and ill health was also reflected in the community per-
ception of poverty. In the FGDs carried out during the
CWR process the criteria used to differentiate between
the poor and the rich included, among others, health
status and capacity to pay for medical costs [34]. These
two criteria are directly related to adverse selection.
Hence, the poor households identified for subsidy had
more sick individuals than the other households (22.94%
vs. 18.49%; p-value = 0.001) probably because continued
inability to seek health care when needed ultimately
translates into more acute ill health.
This finding raises important concerns for CBHI
schemes. CBHI is an important mechanism for increasing
access to health care and providing financial protection
against the cost of illness to low-income rural and infor-
mal sector workers who are currently excluded from any
government financing mechanisms. Primarily reason to
introduce subsidies in CBHI is to make it affordable for
the poorer sections of the society. However, as found in
this study, these subsidies can also increase adverse selec-
tion. Unlike private for-profit schemes, this is not really
‘adverse’ selection but rather ‘preferred’ selection in the
context of CBHI. From a public health viewpoint, we want
the high risk individuals to be able to benefit from health
care. Nonetheless, by increasing adverse selection, tar-
geted subsidies also put greater strain on the financial via-
bility of the scheme.
CBHI schemes can introduce cross-subsidization (the
rich households pay a higher premium) as a means to
bridge this financial gap. However, in Nouna district and
many other low-income regions where such schemes are
operating, rich households are not necessarily rich, ra-
ther simply less poor. If premiums are increased, enrol-
ment among these households will decline. This is likely
not only to worsen equity but also to further increase
adverse selection. If targeted subsidies are implemented
as a means to reach universal coverage government or
donor funds that subsidize premiums for high-risk
populations are essential as echoed by several others
[6,8,22,35].
Technical inputs for the design, management and moni-
toring of voluntary CBHI schemes are essential to save
these schemes from problems of adverse selection [7]. Pol-
icies on subsidies that balance the objectives of universal
coverage and adverse selection should be thoroughly
researched as reiterated by Carrin et al. [36] who note that
public authorities and donors should study these policies in
terms of volume, timing and destination. Targeted subsidies
for poor (or other high-risk groups) must be accompanied
with a sound plan to bridge the financial gap due to adverse
selection so that these schemes can continue to serve these
populations.
Study limitations
It is worth noting some limitations of this study. This
study was based on a small sample of enrolled indivi-
duals, reflective of low enrolment rates at the population
level. This problem was made worse due to high attri-
tion in the sample. The random sample originally con-
sisted of 990 households comprising of approximately
7900 individuals. Our study was based on 6713 indivi-
duals and all these individuals were not present all years.
Most of this attrition could be attributed to emigration
that ranged between 7-9% during this period [37]. Small
sample could have biased the regression results.
Conclusion
Adverse selection is an important concern for any volun-
tary health insurance scheme. In the context of CBHI
which serves primarily poor populations, this problem is
even more severe. Targeted subsidies are often used as a
tool to pursue the vision of universal coverage, which
are also associated with increased adverse selection. This
study highlights the need for well researched subsidy
policies that balances the objectives of universal cover-
age and adverse selection.
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